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Abstract 
Scholars often mention the centrality of parties for the democratic political system. Indeed political 
parties are indispensable institutions for the linkage between state and society, and should not remain 
absent in any comparative analysis of citizens’ political attitudes. Yet, only rarely do scholars study 
how parties shape people’s opinion about democracy. This article seeks to amend this lacuna and 
examine empirically how party level characteristics, specifically the nature of a party’s candidate 
selection procedure, relate to the level of satisfaction with democracy among citizens. The authors 
constructed a cross-national dataset with data on the selection procedures of 130 political parties in 28 
country-sessions to examine whether citizens that vote for democratically organized parties are more 
satisfied with the way democracy works in their country. Additionally, this relationship is examined 
more closely in Israel and Belgium, two countries where candidate selection procedures show 
substantial variation and where politicians have made a strong claim for intraparty democratization. 
Both the cross-national as well as the country-specific analyses indicate that democratic candidate 
selection are indeed associated with greater satisfaction with democracy. 
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Introduction 
"Likud members are the best arranging committee we have, and they are the ones who are 
going to select the Likud list for the next Knesset. One of the main problems in the current 
Knesset is that about 80 Knesset Members were not selected in democratic selections and 
they have almost no responsiveness to the public but rather to the person or rabbi that 
nominated them. Likud cannot make others' mistakes." (MK Ardan, Ynet, 15/11/2007)4 
 
Scholars often mention the centrality of parties for the democratic political system, the electoral 
process and the legislative arena. Indeed, it is hard to conceive of representative democracy without 
political parties as a fundamental organizational feature. Political parties are essential for preference 
aggregation and elite recruitment and constitute the meso-level in representative democracies: they are 
indispensable institutions for the linkage between state and society, and should not remain absent in 
any comparative analysis of political attitudes of citizens. Yet, only rarely do scholars study how 
parties shape people's opinion about democracy. This paper, based on a cross-national comparative 
dataset of parties' candidate selection methods, examines the effect of democratic intraparty candidate 
selection processes on citizens’ political attitudes, specifically citizens' satisfaction with democracy. 
There is a strong claim that, when citizens have high levels of satisfaction with democracy 
representative democracies profit. Indeed, democratic political culture is often considered a crucial 
asset for democratic political systems. Over the years, political attitudes of citizens and its 
determinants have drawn considerable research attention (e.g., Anderson & Guillory, 1997; Clarke & 
Acock, 1989). Some studies on this topic inspect individual-level determinants of political attitudes 
such as gender, age, education, political sophistication and income, while others also add a number of 
macro-level institutional causes of political attitudes, such as the electoral system (Blais & 
 
4 Yael Shomer received funding for this research from the European Community's Seventh Framework 
Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement no. 276914, and from the Norwegian Research Council 
grant no. 222442. Gert-Jan Put thanks the Research Foundation Flanders (FWO) and the KU Leuven Junior 
Mobility Programme for their generous support. All datasets used in the paper and code for replicating the 
models are available at: 
https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi%3A10.7910%2FDVN%2F4B5AD1.  
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Dobrzynska, 1998; Anderson, 1998; Anderson & Guillory, 1997) or economic performance (Lipset & 
Schneider, 1987; Mishler & Rose, 1997; Van Deth & Elff, 2004). What remains to be under-
researched, however, is the impact of political parties on citizens’ views on democracy and politics.  
The nexus between parties and citizens' perceptions about democracy is important especially 
in times of partisan de-alignment where partisan attachments are in decline and people's satisfaction 
with democracy, trust and support for institutions deteriorate (Dalton, 1996; Dalton, 1999; Mishler & 
Rose, 1997). Indeed, democratic selection procedures were adopted by some parties exactly as a mean 
to increase democratic legitimacy and the appearance of fairness, while attracting new members so as 
"to strengthen members' and voters' sense of involvement in party affairs" (Ashiagbor, 2008).  
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. We first, extend the literature that 
examines the effect of democratic institutions and their functioning by examining how intra-party 
institutions affect citizens' perceptions towards democracy. Similar to many other scholars (e.g., 
Anderson & Guillory, 1997), we combine institutional level information with individual public 
opinion data but we add the political party level as an additional explanatory layer.  
Second, we try to systematically solve a controversy in the literature whereby some argue that 
democratization of selection processes has positive consequences (Cross, 1996; Norell, 2008) while 
others emphasize their negative impacts (Kernell, 2013).  We focus on one specific arena of conflict—
that of opinion towards democracy—and try to empirically verify whether democratic candidate 
selection processes are associated with increased citizens' satisfaction with democracy, or whether 
democratic selection procedures bring inner-party divisions and disagreements to the public forefront, 
causing citizens' satisfaction with democracy to decrease. Indeed the theoretical literature disagrees 
about the effect of candidate selections on political attitudes. On the one hand, it is often argued that 
political parties could actively increase political interest and participatory levels by democratizing 
candidate or leadership selection procedures and giving members and citizens a voice in the political 
recruitment process (Shapira, Kenig & Itzkovitch-Malka, 2010). Democratic selection processes, and 
especially primaries will increase participation, strengthen competitiveness, improve representation as 
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parliament members will be responsive and accountable to the wider selectorate, who voted for them 
(Kenig, 2012), reinforce procedural fairness and boost legitimacy.  In this manner, parties could 
perform the role of democratic attitude-promoters, which would be a strong argument in favor of 
democratically organized political parties. On the other hand, some scholars contended that 
democratized selection procedures should intensify intra-party competition, unveil intra-party 
disagreements and lead to greater distrust in parties and dissatisfaction with democracy (Kernell, 
2013). In this paper, we empirically examine whether democratic candidate selection procedures are 
positively or negatively associated with citizen's views about democracy.  
We empirically address these issues in two steps. First, we begin by studying whether and 
how democratized candidate selection processes affect citizens' overall satisfaction with democracy. 
To this end we use a cross-national analysis, estimating a three-level hierarchical model, where 
individual respondents are nested within parties, which in turn are nested within countries. The 
analysis is based on a cross-national comparative dataset containing information on 130 parties’ 
candidate selection methods from 28 different country-sessions worldwide. We use various cross-
national public opinion surveys (CSES, WVS, EVS, Afrobarometer, Latino Barometro and ESS) to 
measure citizens’ satisfaction with democracy. The hierarchical model enables us to properly measure 
parties' candidate selection procedures at the party level (Shomer, 2014; Hazan & Rahat, 2010), while 
controlling for individual, party and country level characteristics. We find support that 
democratization of selection processes, and specifically, increasing the scope of the selectorate 
positively relates to citizens' satisfaction levels with democracy.  
In a second step, we further verify and strengthen the validity of this finding using two case 
studies: Belgium and Israel. Both systems enjoy a relatively large number of viable parties which 
present variation in their selection methods. This cross-party, as well as cross-temporal, variation 
enables us to ascertain, within each case separately, whether and how selection procedures affect 
satisfaction with democracy, and to account for potential alternative explanations that the cross-
national analysis is not fit to deal with. Moreover, in both countries it was parties and politicians 
themselves that argued in favor of democratized selection processes by mentioning their desirability 
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for democratic legitimacy.  In the beginning of the 1990s, reporters and politicians observed a sharp 
decline in regime trust among Belgian citizens. At the time, former Flemish liberal party leader—Guy 
Verhofstadt—clearly believed that this gap between citizens and the Belgian political elite could be 
overcome by reforming some of the country's institutional structures. Specifically with regards to 
candidate selection, he stated that "[parties] should no longer be able to autonomously decide who gets 
selected as candidate and who gets dismissed. Theoretically, every citizen is able to run for election, 
but in practice no one stands a chance of getting elected without a decent position on the party list. 
Unfortunately, voters are not able to decide on these party list positions. Citizens have absolutely no 
control over the electoral chances of candidates. [...]. Like in the United States, Belgium needs real 
primary elections. Citizens that register on the party’s voter list, should get the opportunity to 
exclusively determine the composition of the party candidate list” (Verhofstadt, 1991)." In Israel the 
education minister, Gideon Saar, said in the notional youth rally to commemorate Yitzhak Rabin that 
"parties that do not hold primaries hurt democracy". In critiquing parties that do not use primaries Saar 
said that "unfortunately many parties in Israel do not hold democratic procedures to select their 
Knesset candidates. When the party list is chosen by a non-democratic process", said Saar, "it erodes 
the democratic dimension of the political system as a whole" (Karni, 2012).  
We, therefore, use Israel and Belgium as a variant of a "nested analysis" that enables us to 
"assess the plausibility of the observed statistical relationships between variables" found in the cross-
national analysis (Lieberman, 2005). Specifically, we examine 3 consecutive legislative sessions 
(2003-2013) for Israel and 5 consecutive sessions (1995-2014) for Belgium, and using a two-level 
hierarchical model we strengthen the internal validity and consequently the support for the hypothesis 
that voters who vote for parties that select via more democratic selection processes possess higher 
levels of satisfaction with democracy. 
It is important to stress that the findings do not demonstrate that democratization of selection 
processes causes positive attitudes towards democracy. Rather we find support for an association 
between democratization of selection procedures and positive evaluations of democratic performance. 
In the conclusion we provide future research ideas for establishing causality.  
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In the next part of the paper, we summarize the most important explanatory factors of citizens’ 
satisfaction with democracy mentioned in the literature. Subsequently, we focus on the role of political 
parties in this story. The literature on party decline and innovation mentions that parties with declining 
membership figures often turn to internal democratization to revitalize levels of trust and political 
interest (Scarrow, Webb & Farrell, 2000; Leduc, 2001). We link this claim with the literature on 
candidate selection methods and present how the inclusiveness of the selectorate and the level of 
decentralization are expected to influence satisfaction levels. The subsequent section delineates the 
hierarchical structure of the data, and presents the method used to estimate the models. The results 
section discusses the effect of selection procedures on satisfaction with democracy, and the concluding 
part puts these results into theoretical perspective and presents future directions for research. 
Satisfaction with Democracy 
Citizens' democratic attitudes and political culture are quintessential elements for any democratic 
system (Geissel, 2008). The democratic nature of countries is not only determined by democratically 
organized institutional models, but also by the specific attitudes of its citizens towards democracy and 
politics in general. Studies identify several theoretical mechanisms to explain satisfaction with 
democracy: cultural, institutional, sociological, cognitive, and rational (Bratton et al. 2005). Huang, 
Chang & Chu (2008) focus on modernization theories, hypothesizing that citizens with modernized 
characteristics will tend to critique their democracy and be less satisfied with it. Anderson and 
Guilleroy (1997) look at 11 European democracies and find that the level of consensuality conditions 
the effect of being in the minority or the majority on a citizen's satisfaction levels. Specifically they 
show that losers are less satisfied than winners. And also, that losers in consensual countries are more 
satisfied with democracy than losers in majoritarian democracies.  
Indeed, ample research has been devoted to study the determinants of satisfaction with 
democracy and previous studies mostly focus on the effects of country-level determinants 
(institutional, cultural and economic) and individual respondents' characteristics when explaining 
cross-national variation in democratic satisfaction. Of all the country level aspects believed to impact 
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democratic attitudes, the electoral system has probably received the highest amount of research 
attention. It appears there are several electoral mechanisms at work which might affect citizens' 
democratic attitudes. It has been argued that through their effect on citizens' involvement, 
representation (Bowler, Lanoue & Savoie, 1994), levels of trust (Miller & Listhaug, 1990; Lijphart, 
1999), and sense of efficacy, proportional representation systems enhance citizens' satisfaction with 
democracy (Blais & Dobrzynska, 1998; Anderson, 1998). Yet, Aarts and Thomassen (2008) discover 
a negative relationship between PR systems and satisfaction with democracy, and similarly other 
authors find no positive association between the number of represented political parties and efficacy as 
they challenge the positive effect of PR systems on democratic attitudes (Karp & Banducci, 2008). 
District Magnitude (DM) is an additional important feature of electoral systems which affect citizen's 
democratic attitudes, since it determines the nature of the linkage between voters and their 
representatives.   
Apart from the electoral system, other country level predictors come into play as well. The age 
of the democratic system has an impact on the level of satisfaction with democracy such that older 
democracies experience greater satisfaction (Aarts & Thomassen, 2008, but see: Huang, Chang & 
Chu, 2008). Governmental performance is also an important determinant of attitudes towards 
democracy (Dalton, 1999; Mishler and Rose, 2001). Typically, performance is operationalized and 
measured in two distinct ways: first, most studies include a number of objective aggregate-level 
performance measures such as GDP per capita, inflation, civil liberties and political rights levels, and 
corruption levels (Norris, 2011). Indeed a country's economic performance has been linked to citizens’ 
political attitudes (Wagner, Schneider & Halla, 2009). Thus, analogous to voting behavior, attitudes on 
democracy and the political system are indeed also influenced by the economic situation, usually 
measured in terms of inflation, unemployment rate or GDP per capita. Additionally, corruption levels 
have been found to influence various forms of political attitudes (Anderson & Tverdova, 2003). 
Second, studies typically include micro-level perception or evaluation of performance, such as 
perceived corruption levels, perceived fairness and governmental responsiveness and perception of 
8 
 
representational functions (Aarts & Thomassen, 2008; Önnudóttir & Harðarson, 2011) as measures of 
governmental performance.  
In addition to country-level determinants and evaluations of governmental performance, 
citizens' individual characteristics also shape their satisfaction with democracy. Besides the usual 
independent variables such as age, gender and individual economic circumstances, the literature has 
repeatedly stressed the importance of political sophistication, respondents' self-ideological placement 
and their educational levels for forming political attitudes (Niemi, Craig & Mattei, 1991; Dalton, 
2008; Myunghee, 2009).   
What about Parties? 
As mentioned in the introduction of this paper, the impact of the party-level has rarely been 
considered in the large majority of studies on political attitudes. The existing literature largely ignores 
the fact that political parties vary in their behavior and electoral strategies, and that citizens might be 
affected by these interparty-differences.  
One of the notable exceptions is the work of Paskeviciute & Anderson (2003), who linked 
citizens to parties and differentiated those parties on the basis of their goals. Their results show that the 
level of support for the political system in general, and political parties in particular strongly varies 
according to party type. Anderson (1998) examined the impact of party and party system performance 
in mobilizing citizens' support on satisfaction with democracy. He found that party performance was 
the best indicator of differences in satisfaction across democracies.  
But what about other characteristics such as the internal organization of political parties? Authors have 
largely neglected to theorize and empirically test this type of party-level determinant while studying 
citizens' political attitudes. This is surprising, since the literature on intraparty democracy often 
implicitly refers to the possible effects of democratic intra-party selection processes on levels of 
participation, trust in parties, and satisfaction with democracy by deeming a party trustworthy in the 
eyes of citizens (Levi & Stoker, 2000). In what follows, we review this literature and formulate a 
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number of hypotheses about the effects of intra-party democracy on citizens’ satisfaction with 
democracy. 
 
Candidate selections' effect on citizens’ satisfaction with democracy 
Recruitment and selection of political elites is one of the most important activities of political 
parties. Indeed, in recent decades party scholars have started to produce a great deal of literature on 
various aspects of this topic. First, the evolution of candidate selection methods has been studied 
extensively, both in single-country and cross-national studies (e.g.  Gallagher & Marsh, 1988; Bille, 
2001; Siavelis & Morgenstern, 2008). Second, researchers examined the determinants of candidate 
selection processes (Lundell, 2004; Shomer, 2014), and lastly research focused on the effect selection 
processes have on the political arena for example, on intra-party representation (Hazan & Rahat, 2010) 
or legislators' behavior and party unity (Shomer, 2009; Akirav, 2010; Hix, 2004).  
Across most of the literature, scholars utilize Hazan's and Rahat's analytical framework of 
candidate selection processes (Hazan & Rahat, 2001; 2010), which disentangles four dimensions of 
candidate selection, among which level of decentralization and inclusiveness of the selectorate are the 
most important ones. We focus in this paper on these two dimensions.      
Parties have experimented with several remedies to amend the perceived decline in their 
status, manifested by decline in partisan attachment and trust (Van Biezen, Mair & Poguntke, 2012). 
One of those remedies is to democratize internal decision-making procedures, for example by opening 
up candidate selection processes to wider selectorates and by adopting membership votes for party 
leadership selections (Bille, 2001; Hazan, 2002; Scarrow, Webb & Farrell, 2000; Leduc, 2001; Cross 
& Pilet, 2014). Yet, democratizing candidate selection procedures and opening it to a larger body of 
selectorate might bare both positive and negative consequences for citizens' perceptions on parties and 
democracy more generally. We hypothesize both alternatives, and subject the opposing hypotheses to 
empirical analysis to determine whether democratized selection processes bare positive or negative 
effects on democratic attitudes. On the one hand, democratic candidate selection processes were 
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designed to bring citizens back in the political process by increasing responsiveness, transparency and 
party membership appeal (Cross, 1996; Scarrow, 1999). The literature on the effect of institutions on 
satisfaction tells us that procedural fairness and transparent procedures encourage and promote 
positive evaluations (Miller & Listhaug, 1999). Democratized candidate selection processes, and 
especially primaries, are perceived as a more fair procedure than selection in smoked filled back 
rooms and they are clearly more transparent (De-Luca et al., 2002). Indeed by increasing the scope of 
the selectorate and ultimately adopting primaries, parties signal that members and voters are welcome 
to voice their opinion in intra-party matters, as they open up the "black box" and increase transparency 
and accountability. Consequently, party democratization is a way to give party members and voters an 
opportunity to have a democratic voice, and for that voice to be heard. Indeed the will to give voters a 
voice might be a plausible explanation for the increasing number of democratic intra-party reforms 
(Scarrow, 1996).5  
Mikulska and Scarrow (2008) found in the U.K. that inclusive selectorates are associated with 
higher congruence between representatives and voters. Democratic selections might also encourage 
citizens to participate not only in the selection stage but also on election day. Indeed, Norell (2008) 
found that party democratization has a positive effect on voter turnout and satisfaction with democracy 
in European elections, and there is some evidence that open primary elections lead to higher voter 
turnout (Calcagno & Westley, 2008; Clausen, 2009). Involvement in intra-party decision-making 
processes makes voters believe that their opinion matters, ultimately improving citizens' attitudes such 
as satisfaction with democracy. Democratic selection processes' effect on satisfaction with democracy, 
thus, works via their effect on voters' perception of parties and/or voters' perception of their own 
efficacy. When parties democratize their selection processes, voters' perceptions of the process as fair 
and transparent intensify, and their efficacy levels increase as they are given the chance and ability to 
select candidates (even if they do not take up the opportunity and actually participate in the process).  
As voters' perceptions of parties' image improve, and voters' perceptions of their own efficacy 
increase, voters' satisfaction levels increase as well. 
 
5 Of course, parties may sometimes have other reasons to undertake these reforms, such as severe electoral defeat 
(Hopkin, 2001; Pennings & Hazan, 2001). 
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In line with these arguments, one could expect more inclusive candidate selection methods to 
enhance satisfaction with democracy. Hence, our first hypothesis states: 
H1a. Inclusive candidate selection methods are associated with greater 
satisfaction with democracy among citizens. 
While some scholars present potential positive consequences for enlarging the scope of the selectorate, 
others argue that intra-party democratization efforts often do not lead to the desired effects. For 
instance, democratic changes in party leadership selection has not been found to have a positive effect 
on political participation, nor did it lead to higher levels of competition among candidates (Carty & 
Blake, 1999; Kenig, 2008). Furthermore, the representativeness of parties is claimed to have been 
lower in candidate selection procedures with more inclusive selectorates (Spies & Kaiser, 2012; Rahat, 
Hazan & Katz, 2008) as the ability to balance the ticket is greater the more exclusive the selectorate is 
(Hazan & Rahat, 2010). Some scholars argue that party elites who appear to open up their procedures 
for members and voters, in fact try to manipulate intra-party democracy for their own ends (Marsh, 
1993; Mair, 1994). 
Kernell (2013) examines 20 democracies and finds that voters are less likely to vote for parties 
that select by the voters rather than by party leadership. One of the explanations she gives relates to 
intra-party factionalism. Kernell claims that when voters are involved in selection processes they are 
more aware of the internal disagreements and struggles within the party than they would have been in 
cases the party selected via leadership: "when voters are more educated about internal party divisions 
they may be less likely to identify with a party's platform or to show up at the polls (129)".On a similar 
vein, Hazan and Rahat (2010) argue that exclusive selection processes lead to the lowest levels of 
intra-party competition, which in turn, minimize potential voters' exposure to intra-party conflicts. 
More inclusive selectorates encourage competition, which exacerbates intra-party divisions. These 
divisions might harm a party's reputation and decrease citizens' trust in parties, the parliament and 
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their overall satisfaction with democracy6. When democratic selection processes intensify competition 
and disagreements and reduces unity levels, citizens' perceptions of parties decline and consequently 
their overall satisfaction levels with democracy. As party's image declines, voters' satisfaction levels 
decrease as well (see a similar argument made by Leiter and Clark (2015), who argue that when 
governing parties' image with regards to important valance characteristics (e.g., unity, integrity and 
competence) declines, citizens' satisfaction with democracy decline as well). 
Greene and Haber (2015) examine how parties' intra-party disagreements affect citizens' 
evaluation of parties and citizens' vote choice. The authors claim that personal vote seeking incentives 
increase voter's perceptions about parties' disagreements as it facilitates intra-party heterogeneity in 
voting behavior in parliament. These intra-party disagreements, argue Greene and Haber, negatively 
affect citizens' evaluation of parties, and affect their vote choice on election-day. Increasing the scope 
of the selectorate and democratizing the process intensify personal vote seeking incentives as 
candidates have to compete against their co-partisans (Shomer, 2009; Crisp, 2007). This intensified 
intra-party competition may lower levels of party cohesion and party unity (Hazan & Rahat, 2006; 
Rahat, 2007), and increase the likelihood voters will perceive the party as suffering from internal 
divisions and disagreements. Moreover, in the context of intra-party competition, negative campaign 
may further signal voters the internal party divisions. Under these circumstances, voters may form 
negative evaluations of parties that use democratized selection processes, effectively reducing their 
overall level of democratic satisfaction. 
H1b. Inclusive candidate selection methods are associated with lower 
satisfaction with democracy among citizens. 
As mentioned earlier, the second dimension examined in this paper is selection processes' 
decentralization levels. This dimension describes the party level that is in control of the candidate 
selection process and has less to do with the level of democratization within parties per se (Hazan & 
Rahat, 2010), and therefore we suspect it will play a less crucial role in affecting citizens' evaluations 
 
6 Note that Hazan and Rahat (2010) actually advocates a curvilinear relationship whereby exclusive selectorates 
promotes the lowest levels of competitions, primaries promotes medium range competition levels, and party 
delegates correlates with the highest levels of competition.  
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of democracy. Despite this suspicion, we again formulate two opposing hypotheses on the effect of 
this second dimension, and allow the data to determine whether and how it affects democratic attitudes  
On the one hand, as selection takes place with a decentralized mechanism, voters might feel 
their own local geographic interests are being preserved compared to selection processes which take 
place at a national level, which are by definition more remote from the voters themselves. Indeed, 
Hazan (1999) argues that the introduction of some decentralized elements in Labour's and Likud's 
candidate selection processes prior to the 14th Israeli Knesset elections, added local dimension in an 
otherwise unitary system, and enabled a geographical political representation that did not exist prior to 
it. He concluded that candidates competing in the decentralized process, geared their campaign, and 
their post electoral behaviors towards a particular geographically concentrated group of voters.  Based 
on this logic one might expect that:  
H2a. Decentralized candidate selection methods are associated with greater 
satisfaction with democracy among citizens. 
While decentralized selection processes may bring about positive implications and improves citizens' 
democratic attitudes, decentralization may also unveil intra-party disagreements across the 
geographical units, and between the national and local dimension of the party, and hence generate 
distrust in parties and dissatisfaction with democracy in general. Indeed, Hazan (1999) argues that in 
interviews, party officials admitted that when the decision to include constituencies in the primaries 
was approved, "the possibility of local interests coming into conflict with national party interests was a 
factor that they failed to address" (800). Similarly, Sieberer (2006) found decentralized processes to be 
associated with lower levels of Rice Scores compared to centralized selection processes7. Moreover, 
previous research has shown that high levels of decentralization in candidate selection breeds low 
competition between candidates (Hazan and Rahat, 2010), which means that incumbent legislators do 
not have to face serious intraparty contenders in their districts. This might foster citizens’ perception 
 
7 Yet, others argued that decentralized procedures do not necessarily encourage disunity (see: Hazan and Rahat, 
2010, p. 158).  
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that political parties are oligarchically structured organizations with dangerously low levels of 
turnover, and consequently lower citizens' satisfaction levels with democracy.  
H2b. Decentralized candidate selection methods are associated with 
lower satisfaction with democracy among citizens. 
Data and method 
We use both cross-national as well as case studies to examine whether and how democratized 
candidate selection procedures associates with satisfaction with democracy. For the cross-national 
three-level hierarchical model we built an original dataset on the political attitudes of 21,805 citizens 
nested in 130 political parties, from 28 country-sessions (see the appendix for more details)8. Samples 
were derived from numerous cross-national public opinion surveys, complemented by a smaller 
number of national election studies9.  
Data on intra-party candidate selection processes is scarce, especially since its appropriate 
level of measurement is at a given party in a given legislative term (Hazan & Voerman, 2006). Finding 
surveys that correspond (in terms of countries and years) to the parties for which we were able to 
collect selection data was also challenging. Moreover, in order to link individual respondents to parties 
we had to use items about their party preferences hence we used "who did you vote for in the previous 
 
8 Combining datasets between various comparative surveys is a reasonable approach, however the reader should 
be cautioned that design effects do differ across international surveys. For example, while the CSES are post-
election surveys taking place not long after the election, the other comparative surveys used in this analysis deal 
with a broader set of human values and research themes. Thus, for some of the country years used in the 
analysis, the data collection process took place longer after the elections and candidate selection processes under 
investigation occurred. Despite these differences, we argue that the similarities between the various studies are 
strong. First, the question wording and response scale for the satisfaction with democracy item (our dependent 
variable) is similar for all surveys (except for the Israel 1999 country session in ESS, where a 0-10 scale was 
recoded to 4 point scale). Second, studying the methodological notes and reports for each of the comparative 
surveys boosts confidence that their resulting datasets can be combined. In terms of sampling, mostly equivalent 
sampling plans have been followed where multistage sampling has been used: primary units were localities (e.g. 
counties, regions, municipalities), selected according to their population size. In a second step, secondary units 
(individual respondents) were randomly selected within the primary units (e.g. on the basis of electoral 
registers). In sum, the reported minor differences do not outweigh the advantages of combining these 
comparative survey datasets. As Norris (2009) puts it, “when large-scale multi-national surveys covering many 
societies are combined with systematic variations in institutional and societal contexts, this process is capable of 
providing powerful insights for the study of comparative politics.  
9 In order to estimate the effect of institutional determinants and selection procedures on the attitudes of citizens, 
we first, needed to make sure that the surveys were taken after the election (for which the selection of candidate 
took place) and the start of the parliamentary term. At that moment, candidate selection procedures already took 
place and survey respondents’ attitudes could have been influenced by it. 
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election?" (found in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) and European Social Survey 
(ESS)) or "who would you vote for if there were elections tomorrow/this week" (found in the World 
Values Survey (WVS), European Values Study (EVS), Afrobarometer and Latin Barometer). Yet, 
unfortunately the surveys for many country-sessions did not ask either of these questions, so 
establishing this link, and nesting respondents within parties was impossible for them.  
In light of all these considerations, cases for the cross-national analysis were not chosen 
randomly, but rather based on data availability. Nonetheless, our sample of countries is diverse as it 
includes both established as well as new democracies (a characteristic we control for in the analysis) 
and our sample of parties spans the variation of selection procedures from parties that use extremely 
exclusive selectorates to those that adopt primaries. Additionally, the selection of cases into the 
analysis is not correlated with either the outcome variable or any of the predictors, and we are 
confident the results we obtain are not biased by the difficulties of selecting cases. 
In light of the cross-national analysis' pitfalls, we supplement it with two case studies—Israel 
and Belgium—that enable us to further test and explain the theoretical mechanism that underlies the 
hypotheses and evaluate the validity of the cross-national's empirical findings.10  The addition of the 
Belgian and Israeli cases enables us to employ a variant of a "nested analysis" (Lieberman, 2005), that 
help us gain additional insights on the research question; analyze rival explanations; and ascertain the 
internal validity of our argument. Specifically, we use  Israel and Belgium to, first, control for 
additional individual variables (e.g., education and income) and party level characteristics (e.g., party 
switching), so as to analyze rival explanations, which the literature identifies as central to explaining 
variation in satisfaction with democracy, and for which we could not control in the cross-national 
analysis in light of data availability concerns. Thus, analyzing Israeli parties while controlling for 
intra-legislative party switching enables us to ascertain that the relationship between selection 
processes and satisfaction with democracy are not spurious. Likewise, the fact that the relationship 
between democratic selection processes and high levels of satisfaction with democracy gains support 
 
10 For the first three Belgian country sessions, we used data from the General Election Study Belgium, carried 
out by the Pole Interuniversitaire Opinion public et Politique (PIOP) and the Instituut voor Sociaal en Politiek 
Opinieonderzoek (ISPO). For the last two country sessions, ESS data on Belgian citizens was downloaded. With 
regard to the Israeli case study we used the Israel Democracy Institute's Israeli Democracy Index surveys. 
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in Belgium and Israel in a more detailed model specification, helps us gain confidence in the main 
findings of the study.Second, we use the fact that some parties in Israel and Belgium exhibit cross-
temporal variation in their selection procedures to further supplement our internal validity and help us 
analyze rival explanations. We show that supporters of parties that altered their selection processes 
over the years did indeed experience changes in their levels of satisfaction with democracy in the 
hypothesized direction, e.g., as the party democratized its selection processes its supporters expressed 
higher levels of satisfaction11. We shift the level of analysis to parties as we follow one of Lieberman's 
recommendations for a "nested analysis", i.e., that the case study analysis will require "an examination 
of within-case processes and/or variation" (440). Of course one needs keep in mind the limitations for 
external validity and generalizability concerns that accompany any case study analysis. Nonetheless, 
we believe the combination of the cross-national analysis with the two case studies land support for 
the main hypotheses of the paper.  
Figure 1 about here. 
We operationalize satisfaction with democracy using the question `on the whole are you very 
satisfied, rather satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy is developing 
in our country?’ To ease interpretation we reverse the order of the four category Likert scale such that 
1 signifies 'not at all satisfied' and 4 stands for very satisfied12. Figure 1 presents the distribution of 
satisfaction with democracy in the 28 country-sessions included in the analysis.  
The key predictor in the analysis refers to parties' candidate selection processes. It is a party 
level phenomenon, which measures the manner by which candidates get permission to represent the 
party's banner comes election days, and in some cases the process also determines the order on the 
ballot in which they will appear. As mentioned, we use two major criteria to analyze selection 
 
11 Additionally, we are able to anecdotally demonstrate that the positive relationship we found between 
democratic selections and satisfaction are not a product of a temporal dynamic such that democratic selections' 
negative effect on satisfaction levels are in the short run, but their positive effect is a longer term process. Hence, 
we use Israel's Labour party and Belgium's CVP to test the potential temporal dynamic (results are available 
from the authors upon request). We thank an anonymous reviewer for directing our attention to Lieberman's 
article.   
12 The validity of the satisfaction with democracy measure has been established and it was verified that it does 
not simply measure support for the incumbent government (e.g., Kornberg and Clarke (1992).  
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processes: selectorate and decentralization (Hazan & Rahat, 2010). The selectorate is the body that 
selects the candidates, and can be composed of only one person, or several people, up to the entire 
electorate of the nation. This dimension can be measured on a continuum from exclusive selectorates, 
where a very limited group of selectors take control, to inclusive selectorates, such as the party 
members or the electorate. The inclusiveness of the selectorate is operationalized as an ordinal variable 
with three categories: 0 = small group of party leaders; 1 = party delegates; 2 = primaries. 
The second analytical dimension to classify selection processes is decentralization. It 
measures the degree to which selection is devolved. It can be further differentiated into local or 
geographical decentralization and social decentralization (Hazan & Rahat, 2010). 
Geographical/territorial decentralization, measures the influence of local party branches in the 
candidate selection. In highly centralized methods, the national party level has complete control over 
the nomination process. Social decentralization ensures representation of groups such as women or 
unions. It is important to note, as Hazan and Rahat emphasize, that decentralization does not directly 
relate or refer to democratization of candidate selection processes (Hazan & Rahat, 2010). The 
dimension of decentralization is measured using a three category variable with 0 = national candidate 
selection; 1 = local candidate selection with national control or veto; 2 = local selection without 
national interference. To check the validity of the ordinal scales we also present models that use 
treatment contrast on selectorate and decentralization, each, where the base category that is excluded 
from the analysis is the most exclusive selectorate (0), and the most national procedure (0)13.   
In addition to selection processes, we also control at the party level for a party's size and 
whether it belonged to the coalition or opposition. This latter variable controls for the winners and 
losers argument presented by Norris (1999b) and Anderson and Guilleroy (1997) that people who are 
winners and support the party in government tend to have higher satisfaction with democracy and 
 
13 While intra-party variation in selection process exists, we do not address it in this paper and thus code a party's 
selection process according to the manner by which the majority of its MPs were selected. Additionally, we 
emphasize that many parties use complex-multi staged procedures to select their candidates (see Hazan and 
Rahat, 2010). While our 3 point scales are rougher measures of inclusiveness and decentralization, they at least 
allow us the cross-national comparisons. A more detailed scale, which takes into consideration the complexity of 
the selection (like the 25 points scale of selectorate presented by Hazan and Rahat (2010)) are less suitable for 
such cross-national comparisons. 
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higher levels of institutional trust. At the Belgian and Israeli case study analyses, we are also able to 
control for the party's ideology, whereby -1 represent right wing parties, +1 represents left parties, and 
0 represent center parties. 
At the country level (for the cross-national analyses) we control for several predictors. To 
begin with, and to mimic its centrality in the literature on the effect of institutions on political 
attitudes, we include 2 indicators for electoral systems. Thus, we control for the average district 
magnitude (AVDM), where a country's average is a weighted average of the various district 
magnitudes, with weights determined by how many legislators run in districts of each size. Since DM 
determines the nature of the linkage between voters and their legislators, we expect the effect of DM 
on democratic attitudes to take a curvilinear form. Citizens electing legislators in SMD, where DM 
equals one, feel that they are able to hold their legislator accountable as it is very clear who is 
responsible for guarding the district’s political interests. As a result, important democratic attitudes 
such as satisfaction with democracy are expected to be relatively high. As DM increases, however, 
citizens have less clear linkages with legislators and the ability to hold them accountable becomes 
more problematic. This decreased accountability might have detrimental effects on democratic 
attitudes. Yet in very large electoral districts, this negative effect might be neutralized for two reasons. 
First, as mentioned, in electoral systems with high DM, a larger group of citizens feel that their 
political interests are represented by at least one of the elected legislators from their district. So while 
high levels of DM decreases accountability, it increases representation of voters’ preferences. Second, 
in very high levels of DM, the level of electoral competition intensifies as the effective number of 
parties increases (Taagepara & Shugart, 1993). This intensified competition might foster democratic 
satisfaction among citizens. Hence, we also include a squared term of AVDM to allow for the 
possibility of a curvilinear relationship. Second, we follow Anderson (1998), among others, who 
argues that proportional electoral systems are linked to higher levels of support, and we therefore 
control for electoral system types using Lundell and Karvonen's (2003) classification. Following their 
operationalization, we distinguish six categories of electoral systems: 1 = closed party lists; 2 = 
systems with single-member districts; 3 = mixed systems; 4 = Strong preferential voting systems; 5 = 
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Weak preferential voting systems; 6 = No vote pool at party level systems, where the reference group 
excluded from the model and to which all results should be compared to is closed party lists (CLPR 
systems).  
Since scholars found satisfaction with democracy levels to be affected by political 
performance and especially on the economic dimension we include in the cross-national analysis an 
objective aggregate-level measure of economic performance: GDP per capita obtained from the World 
Bank14.  Additionally, we created a binary variable 'new democracy’, to indicate which countries are 
considered 'free’ according to Freedom House for a period of less than 20 years. Countries with over 
20 years of uninterrupted freedom are then considered old democracies. This cut-off point has 
previously been applied by Karp and Banducci (2007).  
The literature on satisfaction with democracy points to several individual level control 
variables we wish to account for, such as age, gender, education, ideology and sophistication. 
However, some of these indicators were simply not asked by many surveys and would have resulted in 
a dramatic reduction of the sample size in the individual, party as well as the country-session levels. 
 
14 The on-line appendix contains a model with an additional aggregate-level measure of governmental 
performance: corruption levels. Unfortunately, while the literature clearly identifies citizens' micro-level 
subjective governmental performance evaluations as a key determinant of their satisfaction with democracy, this 
type of data is simply not available for many of the country-years we study, or are not comparable across 
surveys.  Table d in the on-line appendix contains a model that controls for economic development (in addition 
to the single measure of GDP per capita): a 3-years GDP average growth in percentages (data was calculated 
using the variable rgdpna from the Penn tables). In order to calculate the 3-years average for each country-
session, we took 3 years prior to the election year (+ the election year), and calculated the difference between the 
GDP for each year and the previous year and divided it by the previous year (3 times for each country-session in 
the study). Thus, for example, for Argentina 2005, we calculated (GDP2003-GDP2002) / GDP2002, and did the 
same for 2003-2004 and 2004-2005. That gave us the annual change in GDP. We then calculated the average of 
the 3 of them to obtain a 3 year GDP average growth (in percentage terms). The table in the appendix reveals 
that the main results of the paper did not change, namely the positive relationship between democratic selectorate 
and satisfaction with democracy. Neither did results for GDP/capita or new-democracies, or any party and 
individual level covariates change. Interestingly, and as expected, controlling for all other covariates, economic 
development is positively correlated with satisfaction with democracy. Nonetheless, the inclusion of the growth 
measurement did alter the effect of some of the electoral system variables on satisfaction levels. Thus, in the 
current model neither citizens in SMD systems nor citizens in Mixed systems exhibit differing levels of 
satisfaction with democracy compared to respondents who live in CLPR systems. Nonetheless, while the two 
coefficients lose their statistical significance, their sign remains the same as the one presented in the paper. All in 
all it seems the results concerning the effect of selectorate and decentralization on satisfaction are robust to the 
inclusion of the economic development indicator.  
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We therefore control, in the cross-national analysis, only for respondent's sex (0 = male, 1 = female) 
and age (continuous), while allowing the functional form of age to be curvilinear by adding a squared 
term. In the case studies we were able to also control for education and income15.  
Results 
Table 1 presents the three-levels HLM models in which individual respondents are nested within 
parties which in turn are nested within country-sessions16. The outcome variable is satisfaction with 
democracy. The first model uses the three category indexed version of selectorate and 
decentralization—the main predictors of interest—whereas the second model analyzes the data using 
treatment contrast on selectorate and decentralization. The second model enables verification of the 
validity of the index by examining which type of selection procedures specifically affect levels of 
satisfaction. 
Table 1 about here 
 Clearly, the scope of the selectorate by which a party selects is correlated with citizens' 
satisfaction levels. According to both models, respondents who vote for a party that uses inclusive 
selection procedures tend, on average, to exhibit higher levels of satisfaction with democracy. This 
positive relationship is statistically significant at the first model at the 0.05 level. The second model 
further reveals that compared to the reference group of selection via party leaders, both voters who 
vote for parties that use party delegates and those that vote for parties that employ primaries are more 
 
15 We were unfortunately unable to control for sophistication levels, or strength of partisan attachments. We 
were able to collect respondents' ideological self-placement for all country-sessions in our study except for Japan 
1996. Thus, the total number of country-sessions is reduced to 27 and the total number of parties is reduced to 
128. Consequently we lose 472 respondents. Moreover, while most surveys use an 11 point scale (0-10) when 
asking the respondent to place themselves on a left-right scale, the WVS and EVS, however, use 10 point scales 
(1-10). To enable comparison we merged the 0 and 1 categories from the 11 point-scale into a single category, 
effectively creating a 10 point scale.  Table c in the on-line appendix presents the results. The substantive results 
are similar to the ones presented in the paper, except the effect of Mixed Member electoral systems loses its 
statistical significance (although the sign of the coefficient remains the same). More importantly, the effect of 
selectorate and decentralization is similar to the ones presented in the paper. Interestingly, we find that more 
right wing respondents exhibit higher levels of satisfaction. These results corroborate previous findings in the 
literature (Schäfer, 2013; Anderson and Singer, 2008). We further note that some researchers find a positive 
relationship between ideological congruence between voters and parties and voter's satisfaction levels 
(Myunghee, 2009) but we simply do not have either object or subjective measures of parties' ideological position 
data for all the parties in our study.  
16 The models presented are OLS models. We also ran Hierarchical ordered logit models, and obtained similar 
results, substantively, to the ones presented here. For ease of interpretation we present the Hierarchical Linear 
models. The ordered logit models are available in the appendix.    
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satisfied with democracy (significant at the 0.05 level). Substantively, compared to selecting via party 
leaders, selection via party delegates increases satisfaction with democracy by about 0.2 standard 
deviations and selection using primaries increases satisfaction by more than a quarter standard 
deviation17.  
The cross-national analysis reveals that while the scope of the selectorate correlates with 
satisfaction levels, the degree of selections' decentralization bare no relationships on citizens' 
satisfaction with democracy. In addition, we see that being on the losing or winning side has an effect 
on citizens' levels of satisfaction. Voters who vote for parties that end up being in the coalition, exhibit 
higher satisfaction levels compared to those who support opposition parties. The results concerning the 
effect of electoral systems are interesting. As mentioned we use 2 different variables to tab into the 
various mechanisms that might explain the effect of electoral systems on political satisfaction with 
democracy. To begin with, we control for average district magnitude and anticipate a curvilinear 
relationship between DM and the outcome variable. Theoretically, we hypothesize that when DMs are 
low (=1), voters feel they have a representative in parliament with a direct access, which should 
increase levels of satisfaction with democracy. On the other hand, in systems with very large DMs the 
electoral map is characterized by multiple parties which might afford most voters a sense of 
representation, and therefore increase their satisfaction levels. In the middle range of district 
magnitude we hypothesize satisfaction to be the lowest. Thus we anticipate to find a negative 
coefficient for the AVDM variable, and a positive coefficient for the squared term. As can be seen 
from the results, these theoretical expectations do not gain support and we therefore conclude that 
controlling for all other variables (including the second operationalization of electoral systems to be 
discussed below), district magnitude does not have an effect on citizens' satisfaction levels.     
Our second measure of electoral system is Lundell and Karvonen's preferential voting variable 
(Lundell & Karvonen, 2003). We use a treatment contrast with CLPR as a reference group. We find 
that respondents who live in countries with SMD systems have lower levels of satisfaction with 
democracy compared to voters who live in CLPR, all else equal (significant at a 0.1 level in both 
 
17 The standard deviation of satisfaction with democracy is 0.75.  
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models). Thus, controlling for district magnitude, respondents in SMD systems are less satisfied with 
democracy by 0.33 (out of a 4 point scale) compared to respondents in CLPR countries. SMD systems 
are characterized by great disproportionality which might lead voters to be dissatisfied with the way 
the democratic process works18. Moreover, as we mentioned earlier, two party systems have been 
linked to lower levels of satisfaction with democracy (Miller & Listhaug, 1990) and SMD systems 
highly correlate with such dual party systems (Cox, 1997). Voters in mixed member electoral systems 
also exhibit lower levels of satisfaction compared to voters in CLPR, and so do voters in both, strong 
and weak preferential list systems.  
 We also control at the country level for GDP per capita and new democracy. We find, as 
expected, that voters in countries with better economic performance are more satisfied with 
democracy. Yet, interestingly, we find higher levels of satisfaction in new democracies, compared to 
old democracies. These results corroborates Huang, Chang & Chu's (2008) finding that new 
democracies enjoy a solid base of support19.    
As explained above, issues of data availability prohibit us from incorporating a long list of 
individual level predictors that are hypothesized to affect satisfaction with democracy (such as 
education, income levels and political sophistication). Nonetheless, with regards to the individual 
 
18 We re-ran the analysis controlling for Gallagher Index of disproportionality. While the direction of the effect 
was negative, indicating that indeed voters in disproportional systems exhibit lower levels of satisfaction, the 
effect fails to reach statistical significance at a conventional level. Moreover, while the negative sign of the SMD 
coefficient remained, it, too, failed to reach statistical significance. Corruption levels have been hypothesized to 
affect political attitudes towards democracy (Van der Meer, 2010). The coefficient of political corruption 
measured by Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index is positive, indicating that in cleaner 
countries citizens enjoy higher levels of satisfaction, but the results are insignificant in a conventional level. All 
other results in the model remained the same to the ones presented above. Lastly, regime type has been 
hypothesized to affect satisfaction with democracy (Huang, Chang & Chu, 2008). We ran the models while 
controlling for whether a country is a presidential or a parliamentary system. The regime type's coefficient was 
not statistically significant, while all other results remained similar to the ones presented in Table 1. All models 
can be found in the appendix.  
19 Ideally we would have liked to verify the results using sub-sample analyses that ascertain the aggregate 
findings are not the product of a differing distribution of satisfaction with democracy and selection processes 
across old and new democracies. Unfortunately, only a small segment of our sample constitute new democratic 
countries (8), which result in perfect multi-collinearity among many of the covariates. Nonetheless, we re-ran the 
analysis excluding countries for which data was available during their transitioning to democracy period. Thus, 
individuals and parties were excluded if their data came from an election cycle which occurred during the first 
10 years since democratization/independence. This effectively excluded Croatia, The Czech Republic (both 1996 
and 1998), Hungary, Poland, Russia and Taiwan. The result are similar to the ones presented in the paper, and 
support the same substantive conclusion. Future research that extends the analysis to additional new-democratic 
countries will help shed light on this issue in the future.  
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predictors we see that, in line with several other studies regarding satisfaction with democracy, women 
are less satisfied with democracy than men (Schafer, 2013), which supports the notion that women are 
a weakened, sociological minority group in the society. In addition, it seems younger and older people 
tend to have high levels of satisfaction with democracy, while middle aged citizens seem to exhibit the 
lowest levels of satisfaction with democracy. 
To further validate our main results concerning the correlation between candidate selection 
procedures and satisfaction with democracy we conducted country-specific analyses in both Belgium 
and Israel20. Table 2 presents the results, where for Belgium we pooled 5 legislative terms and Israel 
we pooled 3 legislative terms to examine whether and how candidate selection procedures relates to 
levels of satisfaction. As with the cross-national analysis we present results from models in which 
selectorate and decentralization were included as indexes, as well as models in which we refer to them 
as categorical variables21. 
The results for both Israel and Belgium further support the conclusion that democratic 
candidate selection procedures are positively correlated with satisfaction with democracy. The first 
two columns in Table 2 present the results for Israel, where we calculate that 8% of the variance in 
satisfaction with democracy is explained by party-level characteristics, and the included party-level 
variables account for 11% of that variation. The effect of selectorate is positive and statistically 
significant at the 0.1 level. Thus, increasing the selectorate by 1 unit toward a more inclusive and open 
process, increases citizens' satisfaction with democracy by 0.174, holding all else equal, which is about 
a quarter standard deviation of satisfaction with democracy. Similarly, when we use the selectorate 
variable as a categorical variable we find that voters who vote for parties that use primaries to select 
their lists exhibit satisfaction levels that are higher by 0.253 (out of a four point scale) than voters who 
vote for parties that use party leaders to arrange the list, that is selection via primaries increases 
 
20 We verify party switching does not cause the association we find to be spurious, by adding the covariate intra-
legislative party switching to the Israeli analysis. The results (presented in Table e in the on-line appendix) 
demonstrate that party switching is not correlated with satisfaction with democracy and the substantive results 
concerning the positive relationships between selectorate and satisfaction remains.  
21 For the Israeli models we could not include treatment contrast for both selectorate and decentralization in light 
of perfect multicollinearity and singularity.   
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satisfaction by 1/3 standard deviations. It seems democratic candidate selection procedures are 
associated with positive citizens' views about democracy.    
Table 2 about here 
 Similar to the cross-national results presented in Table 1, voters who vote for coalition parties 
exhibit greater satisfaction with democracy compared to voters who vote for the losing side. 
Specifically, in Israel voting for the coalition increases satisfaction with democracy by 0.142, which is 
a 0.2 standard deviation. Moreover, the results concerning age and gender also mimic the ones 
obtained from the cross-national analysis. Thus, it seems younger and older voters are the ones that 
feel the most satisfied with democracy, and that female are less satisfied than male, although this 
negative coefficient fails to reach statistical significance. Lastly, we find income to be positively 
associated, as expected, with levels of satisfaction.   
 The analysis for Belgium presents a similar picture. Democratized candidate selection 
procedures are associated with higher levels of satisfaction with democracy. A movement of one unit 
on the selectorate index increases satisfaction levels by 0.099 (out of a 4 point scale) holding all else 
constant. Moreover, the treatment contrast of selectorate reveals that the positive relationship between 
selectorate and satisfaction levels stems from the adoption of primaries. Indeed it is voters who vote 
for parties that adopt primaries that exhibit satisfaction levels higher by about 1/3 standard deviations 
compared to their counterparts who vote for parties that use party leaders to choose candidates. The 
satisfaction levels of voters that vote for parties that use delegates and those that support parties that 
use leaders are indistinguishable from one another (although the point prediction is positive as well).  
 The Belgium case presents interesting results as we find decentralized selection processes to 
be negatively correlated with satisfaction with democracy. Recall that in the cross-national analysis as 
well as the Israeli case, decentralization did not have a significant effect on satisfaction levels. But in 
the Belgium case we find that voters who vote for parties that use only localized selection processes 
exhibit lower satisfaction levels compared to voters who vote for parties that use national level 
processes only. In Belgium, when local party branches control candidate selection processes, clashes 
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with national party headquarters are not uncommon. These intraparty tensions might give parties a bad 
image, decreasing citizens’ trust in them as institutions and lowering their levels of satisfaction with 
democracy as well. In addition, as we stated above, decentralized selection processes have been 
associated with low levels of competition between candidates (Hazan and Rahat, 2010), a finding that 
might also explain the negative coefficient of decentralization in Belgium. Indeed, recent research on 
incumbent de-selection in the Belgian case shows that incumbents are significantly safer for de-
selection in nationalized candidate selection processes compared to decentralized ones (author, 2015). 
In decentralized selection processes, incumbents are more often assigned to unrealistic list positions or 
de-selected altogether.  
 The individual level predictors also support their respective hypothesized effect and present a 
similar picture to the one presented by the cross-national and Israel analyses. Specifically, we again 
find younger and older voters to be more satisfied with democracy, and females to be less satisfied. 
We additionally find richer and educated Belgian voters to exhibit higher levels of satisfaction.  
 Using a cross-national analysis and two case studies reveals that democratized selection 
procedures that involve a large body of selectorate are positively related to views about democracy. 
Voters who support parties that use inclusive selection procedures exhibit higher satisfaction levels 
compared to voters who support parties that use restrictive processes.  
Conclusions 
Hazan and Rahat (2010) looked at three aspects of democratized candidate selection processes 
when assessing whether and to what degree they "serve democracy". First, they examine selection 
processes' effect on expression of democratic norms of competition and participation and production 
of democratic outputs of representation and responsiveness. Second, they examine whether and how 
democratized selection methods promotes power diffusion. And lastly, they ask whether democratized 
selections help and strengthen parties as vital organizations in a representative democracy. Our paper 
adds a fourth question and examine whether and how democratized selection processes "serve 
democracy" by promoting citizens' satisfaction levels with democracy.   
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In this paper we seek to empirically test whether democratic candidate selection processes 
affect citizens' political attitudes. It has been widely claimed by politicians, the media, as well as by 
some scholars that opening candidate selection procedures would result in higher levels of trust in 
parties and other institutions that include them like governments and parliaments, and that citizens' 
levels of efficacy, participation, interest in politics and overall satisfaction with democracy would 
increase. Indeed these reasons were sometimes quoted by politicians when debating whether to open 
up candidate selection methods and adopt primaries. However, to date, most research that studies 
political attitudes ignores the meso—party level—characteristic of candidate selection processes. Our 
paper amends this lacuna, moves beyond the static study of institutional difference, and takes party 
seriously when it uses a comprehensive cross-national analysis to verify whether indeed democratic 
selection processes are associated with positive citizens' attitudes.  
Looking at satisfaction with democracy and using 3 level cross national varying-intercept 
hierarchical models, as well as 2 level hierarchical analyses in the case studies of Belgium and Israel, 
we show that democratized candidate selection processes foster positive political attitudes. 
Specifically, increasing the scope of the selectorate—the body of people who are eligible to take part 
in the selection procedures—increases citizens' satisfaction levels with democracy.  
We emphasize that the analysis presented does not prove causation but rather association 
between democratic selection processes and positive democratic attitudes. To further validate 
causation we need to verify whether supporters of parties that altered their selection processes over 
time change their political attitudes in the appropriate direction. In other words, do supporters of a 
party that used exclusive selection process at time t exhibit lower trust and satisfaction levels 
compared to supporters of that same party when it uses primaries at time t+1. Unfortunately, we 
simply do not have enough data from such parties to conduct a full multivariate analysis. For now, we 
can anecdotally say that when the Israeli Likud party altered its intra-party selection processes in 2009, 
and adopted primaries (whereas prior to the 2006 elections the party selected its list via a more 
restrictive organ of party delegates), its supporters' satisfaction levels with democracy (as appears in 
the Israeli National Elections Surveys) increased from a mean of 2.36 in 2006 to 2.56 in 2009. This 
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difference is in the hypothesized direction (such that when Likud selects via primaries its supporters 
are more satisfied with democracy) and is statistically significant at a 0.05 level. Likewise, Kadima 
supporters expressed higher satisfaction levels with democracy, when the party used primaries prior to 
the 2009 elections (2.55), compared to the supporters' satisfaction levels prior to the 2006 elections 
when the party selected via the most restrictive procedure (2.48)22. Since we cannot affirm causation 
using cross-temporal variation in selection processes, we also intend to use a survey experiment of 
conjoint analysis, to examine the relative importance of democratized candidate selection processes 
(relative to other attributes) for respondent's tendency to vote for and trust the party, as well as their 
overall evaluation of a country's democracy23.     
Many scholars theorize and provide empirical support for the notion that increase in the scope 
of the selectorate and especially adopting primaries brings negative consequences for parties 
themselves, and democracy in general. Democratized selection procedures intensify intra-party 
competition and intra-party disagreements, hamper the representativeness of the party's ballot, lower 
participation rates in the selection processes itself, decreases parties' unity level and cohesion scores, 
and even lower the vote share a party receives in the general elections (Hazan & Rahat, 2010; Kernell, 
2013). Our paper, however, discovers one important positive consequence for democratic selection 
processes: namely they bare positive association to citizens' overall satisfaction with democracy. It 
might be that just the perception of a democratic intra-party processes, although it may not really be 
more democratic, helps improve citizens' evaluation of democracy. Nonetheless, it is evident that the 
public welcomes open democratic candidate selection processes. Citizens seem to favor 
representatives that won their nominations on the basis of a broader popular appeal (e.g. among party 
members or even registered citizens), as they feel they can hold these representatives more 
accountable, compared to representatives, who are selected with a more exclusive selection process, 
and who are thus only accountable to a small party elite. 
 
22 We of course stress that these examples are mere illustrations of the theory and not an official test of it.  
23 To further continue exploring whether candidate selection processes affect citizens' political attitudes and 
behaviors we are going to extend the analysis and examine other outcome variables. To begin with, we will 
focus our attention on institutional trust variables, such as citizens' trust in parties, the parliament and the 
government. We also want to examine whether and how democratic intra-party candidate selection processes 
affect citizens' interest levels in politics, their tendency to talk about political events with their relatives and 
friends, and their levels of political efficacy. 
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 Thus, while earlier research has mainly stressed the dangers and dilemmas of intraparty 
democracy, this contribution suggests that parties can be promoters of democratic attitudes among 
citizens by means of internal party democratization (if causality is proven by future research). Put 
differently, internal democracy enhances external democracy, since democratic attitudes such as 
satisfaction with democracy are vital for the well-functioning of representative democracies.Since 
satisfaction with democracy is quintessential for democratic flourish and thrive one cannot afford 
overlooking parties in general and candidate selections' effect in particular, specifically in light of the 
ability to use democratized selection procedures to facilitate citizens' positive democratic attitudes, 
especially in times when they are in decline.  
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Fig. 1 Distribution of satisfaction with democracy in 28 country-sessions 
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Table 1: Selection Effect on Satisfaction with Democracy- Cross National Analysis 
 Parameter Selectorate and 
Decentralization Index 
β (P-value) 
Selectorate and 
Decentralization 
treatment contrast 
 β (P-value) 
Fixed Effects 
 Intercept 2.524 (<0.001) 2.515 (<0.001) 
 Selectorate 0.073 (0.050)  
 Decentralization 0.048 (0.223)  
 Delegates  0.145 (0.016) 
 Primaries  0.192 (0.008) 
 National+Local  0.106 (0.144) 
 Local  0.030 (0.653) 
 Party Size 0.000 (0.515) 0.000 (0.413) 
 Coalition 0.197 (<0.001) 0.191 (<0.001) 
 AVDM 0.004 (0.610) 0.004 (0.652) 
 AVDM^2 -0.000 (0.383) -0.000 (0.405) 
 SMD -0.333 (0.087) -0.336 (0.089) 
 Mixed Systems -0.242 (0.050) -0.224 (0.077) 
 Strong Preferential List 
Systems 
-0.263 (0.012) -0.256 (0.019) 
 Weak Preferential List 
Systems 
-0.285 (0.008) -0.279 (0.012) 
 No pool at party level 
systems 
-0.114 (0.332) -0.110 (0.365) 
 GDP/Capita 0.000 (<0.001) 0.000 (<0.001) 
 New-democracy 0.226 (0.040) 0.193 (0.081) 
 Age -0.007 (<0.001) -0.007 (<0.001) 
 Age2 0.000 (>0.001) 0.000 (<0.001) 
 Gender -0.059 (<0.001) -0.059 (<0.001) 
Variance Components 
Country Level 
 Intercept 0.100 (<0.001) 0.102 (<0.001) 
Party Level 
 Intercept 0.157 (<0.001) 0.155 (<0.001) 
 Residual 0.683 0.683 
    
n. individuals  21,805 21,805 
n. parties  130 130 
n. country-session  28 28 
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Table 2: Selection Effect on Satisfaction with Democracy: Israel and Belgium 
 Parameter Israel 
index 
 
β (P-value) 
Israel 
treatment  
contrast 
 β (P-value) 
Belgium 
Index 
 
β (P-value) 
Belgium 
treatment 
contrast 
 β (P-value) 
Fixed Effects   
 Intercept 2.102 (<0.001) 2.102 (>0.001) 2.208 (<0.001) 2.185 (<0.001) 
 Selectorate 0.174 (0.066)  0.099 (0.069)  
 Decentralization -0.095 (0.497)  -0.110 (0.010)  
 Delegates  0.174 (0.066)  0.130 (0.362) 
 Primaries  0.253 (0.027)  0.230 (0.104) 
 National+Local    -0.026 (0.727) 
 Local    -0.217 (0.009) 
 Party Ideology -0.057 (0.199) -0.057 (.199) 0.009 (0.774) -0.006 (0.886) 
 Coalition 0.142 (0.057) 0.142 (0.057) 0.041 (0.511) 0.021 (0.727) 
 Education  -0.001 (0.773) -0.001 (0.773) 0.065 (<0.001) 0.065 (<0.001) 
 Income 0.033 (0.029) 0.033 (0.029) 0.014 (0.028) 0.014 (0.027) 
 Age -0.015 (0.001) -0.015 (0.001) -0.010 (0.005) -0.010 (0.005) 
 Age2 0.000 (<0.001) 0.000 (<0.001) 0.000 (0.014) 0.000 (0.014) 
 Gender -0.035 (0.218) -0.035 (0.218) -0.109 (<0.001) -0.109 (>0.001) 
Variance Components   
 Intercept 0.197 (0.039) 0.197 (0.039) 0.159 (<0.001) 0.159 (<0.001) 
 Residual 0.714 0.714 0.767 0.767 
      
n. individuals 2627 2627 9215 9215 
n. parties 32 32 40 40 
 
 
